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Foreign Divestment in the Integration Development Path of Greece 
 
Abstract: Research on Investment Development Path (IDP) primarily focuses on conventional FDI. Instead, 
our study extends the IDP to explore foreign divestment within the European integration process 
approaching foreign divestment risk as the outcome of an interaction between regional integration and 
economic development. This is the main contribution of the study. In particular, the paper explores 
divestment risk when the emerging economy of Greece enters the single market which is considered as a 
crucial turning point for its development path. The analysis focuses on the divestment outcome of 162 MNE 
subsidiaries established during the protectionism era and finds considerable manufacturing divestment 
during the transition from protectionism to regional integration in spite of the positive development of the 
Greek economy. However, the divestment effects of the individual explanatory variables used in the study 
are asymmetrical. The findings provide useful lessons for economic policy in emerging economies entering 
a developed integrated area, having interesting integration and FDI policy implications and venues for future 
research. 
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1 Introduction 
The IDP Paradigm in a stage-wise progression connects five different development stages with 
several types of FDI (Narula and Dunning, 2000; Narula and Dunning, 2010). In its later version 
Narula and Dunning (2010) emphasize the importance of points of inflection (turning points) 
during the IDP and the threshold levels of absorptive capacity (e.g., human capital, infrastructure) 
without which countries fail to “take off”. However, despite the existence of a rich IDP literature 
(Ragoussis, 2011; Narula and GuimÏ n, 2010; Kayam and Hisarciklilar, 2009; Fonseca et al., 2007; 
Galan et al., 2007; Barry et al., 2003; Buckley and Castro, 1998), the Paradigm ignores foreign 
divestment primarily focusing on attractive direct investment in each development stage.  
Our paper aspires to shed light in an emerging economy that actively participates in the 
European integration explaining how foreign divestment occurs when the economy reaches a 
strategic turning point of IDP. The specific point can be located during the transition from the 
second to the third stage of the Paradigm that might cause a qualitative transformation of assets and 
create a quite different operational context of MNE subsidiaries than that of their establishment. 
This transition initiates an industrial restructuring reflected in the substitution of traditional assets 
(e.g. labor, tariffs) through created assets in more advanced sectors and high-tech industries. For 
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methodological reasons we distinguish the above process into two main contrasting poles. The left 
pole contains the IDP stages 1 and 2 that are characterized by the exploitation of traditional 
advantages (unskilled labor, tariffs) in emerging, mostly protected economies. The right pole 
includes the three subsequent stages that are closely related to created-asset advantages (especially 
stages 4 and 5) of economically developed countries (Narula and Dunning, 2010; Galan et al., 
2007). Consequently, movements within each pole (i.e., from stage 1 to 2 or from stage 4 to 5) 
might indicate smooth structural changes that adapted through flexible institutions can enable 
corresponding countries to accommodate structural alterations. However, the transition from the 
left to the right pole (that is, especially the entry from the second into the third IDP stage) becomes 
a critical turning point, since this marks a qualitative change from an investment driven economy 
into an innovation driven economy. This point of inflection might represent a gradual replacement 
of Hecksher – Ohlin industries through differentiated industries and innovation-intensive 
Schumpeterian sectors. Therefore, at this point, emerging economies might demonstrate a dual or 
multiple economic structure with the co-existence of traditional and high-tech activities (Narula 
and Dunning, 2010). Which of the two types of activities will prevail remains an open question and 
will determine divestment phenomenon. 
Industrial structural effects might become stronger when development overlaps with 
regional integration (e.g. Narula and Dunning, 2010; Benito et al. 2003; Buckley and Castro, 1998). 
Integration process might increase the risk of deindustrialization of emerging economies (instead of 
increasing economic catch-up and convergence with the developed countries) through the 
intensification of competition due to abolishment of trade barriers (tariffs) and the single market 
effect. More specifically, in the context of European integration, advanced economies in the core 
might benefit more from scale economies and proximity to large markets at the expense of 
peripheral Mediterranean economies such as Greece or Portugal mainly possessing traditional 
advantages like low wages and tariffs (e.g., Krugman and Venables, 1990, 1996). This might 
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generate a strategic reaction of MNEs with important divestment implications in the periphery that 
can be caused by the reorganization of their spatial distribution seeking for more efficient 
exploitation of comparative advantages of the various member countries (e.g., Benito et al., 2003; 
Pearce and Papanastassiou, 1997). Overall, the driving forces of development and integration act 
together showing the need to integrate critical integration elements into the development procedure 
in order to reveal the idiosyncratic nature (i.e., each country follows a unique and individual IDP; 
Narula and Dunning, 2010) of the integration development path. Although the IDP Paradigm 
extensively analyzes globalization and liberalization (Narula and Dunning, 2000), it does not 
incorporate into its stages model integration elements. For instance, the Paradigm does not take into 
account the different nature of market-seeking MNE subsidiaries across individual development 
stages as in the period of protectionism they may exploit tariff protection, whereas in the 
integration they mainly seek for market proximity and product differentiation.  
The above methodological point of view fully matches the needs of our empirical research 
as defined by the particular integration development path of the Greek economy. Our empirical 
analysis focuses on MNE subsidiaries operating in Greece during a forty year period (1960-2001). 
The integration development path of the specific economy is directly interrelated with a relatively 
liberal trade regime. Greece joined the EEC/EU in 1981 which reflects the most important turning 
point of its development path in terms of the passage from protectionism (1960-1980) to integration 
(1981-2001). 
The study contributes to the existing literature as follows: To the best of our knowledge this 
is the first work that utilizes the IDP Paradigm for the explanation of foreign divestment instead of 
investment, thus, its methodological approach extends the IDP research that explicitly focuses on 
conventional FDI. Moreover, the study incorporates into the IDP the dynamic conditions of 
European integration effectively combining regional integration and economic development 
effects. Further, our analysis adopts the suggestion of Narula and Dunning (2010) as regards the 
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importance of turning points of a country during the IDP primarily explaining foreign divestment 
because of failure of the Greek economy to “take off”.  
2. Literature review 
There is a relatively rich literature on IDP however focusing on investment and development (e.g., 
Dunning et al., 2013; Buckley, 2012; Ragoussis, 2011; Narula and Dunning, 2010; Narula and 
GuimÏ n, 2010; Kayam and Hisarciklilar, 2009; Fonseca et al., 2007; Galan et al., 2007; Barry et 
al., 2003; Narula and Dunning, 2000; Buckley and Castro, 1998; Dunning, 1981), and not 
divestment as our study does.  
The idea of an “investment development path” was introduced by Dunning (1981) as a 
dynamic approach within the paradigm of ownership, locational and internationalization (OLI) 
advantages. Subsequently, Narula and Dunning (2010; 2000) evolve further the IDP approach 
hypothesizing an association between a country’s level of development proxied by GDP per capita 
and its international investment position captured by net foreign direct investment stock (outward 
minus inward FDI stocks). Their analysis takes into consideration that a host country goes through 
five stages of development linked to different industry specialization and different types of FDI 
correspondingly. In particular, in the first stage host countries possess limited locational advantages 
in unskilled labor – intensive activities resulting in relatively low inflow FDI. In the second stage 
traditional locational advantages again lead to a growing inward FDI activity, inter alia in order to 
utilize new opportunities in protected local markets. In the third stage created-asset L advantages 
such as product differentiation, agglomeration economies, and human capital take effect and 
promote FDI in more innovation-based activities and in highly differentiated branches. In the last 
two stages created L advantages accumulate in innovation-intensive Schumpeterian sectors and 
differentiated industries, thus creating a knowledge economy and the necessary conditions for the 
growth of advanced and market-oriented FDI.  
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In addition, there are some attempts to further improve the IDP context. So, Dunning et al. 
(2013) incorporate trade aspects into the IDP suggesting that there is a certain interface between the 
IDP and the trade development path (TDP), especially in created asset-intensive industries. Further, 
Narula and GuimÏ n (2010) propose that IDP analysis should also take into account the 
idiosyncratic economic structure of countries and the heterogeneous nature of FDI emphasizing the 
turning points in a country’s IDP. In turn, Buckley (2012) approximates critically the work of 
Dunning, especially those referring to Development Paradigm, revealing its gradual character. 
Moreover, in the framework of IDP, Ragoussis (2011) explores the importance of spatial 
determinants for the emergence of inward and outward FDI. 
Surely there are also other empirical studies supplementing the core literature. For instance, 
Buckley and Castro (1998) investigating the case of Portugal propose that the IDP is substantially 
influenced by government policy and European integration policy reflected in Portugal’s accession 
to the European Economic Community. Also, Fonseca et al. (2007) concentrate on the Portuguese 
economy and discuss FDI in the local economy based on the IDP theory. Galan et al. (2007) 
examine the most important factors for the locational decisions of Spanish MNEs in FDI, 
considering host countries at different levels of economic development (Latin America, EU). 
Boudier-Bensebaa (2008) explores FDI in Central and Eastern European economies and concludes 
that these economies are at stage one or two of the IDP and are diverging from EU15 in terms of 
outward investment position but converging in terms of GDP. Finally, Kayam and Hisarciklilar 
(2009) introduce a non-linear fluctuation approach to effectively capture the idiosyncratic nature of 
the IDP and better explain the specific development stage a country is at. 
3. The integration development path of Greece 
Assessing the IDP course of the Greek economy, it becomes clear that Greece passed successfully 
the first two IDP stages in the 1960s and 1970s (protectionism) with substantial GDP growth rates 
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and a large amount of FDI inflows. At that time, many foreign MNEs entered the economy to 
exploit either the protected local market or unskilled labor. In 1981, which might be considered as a 
crucial turning point, Greece became full member of the EEC/EU. In the two subsequent decades 
foreign MNEs faced strong international competition due to the single market effect. There is 
strong evidence that at that time Greece had partially the traits of developing economies such as 
low labor cost and tariffs (stages 1 and 2 of the IDP) and partially the traits of more developed 
economies (mainly those of stage 3) expressed in the appearance of industries with product 
diversity and the superiority of outward FDI relative to inward FDI. In the new environment, labor 
costs were rising compounding the international competitive position of the economy and trade 
barriers were decreasing leading to intensified import competition in the local market. These trends 
caused a wide foreign divestment activity that requires systematic investigation. 
Table 1 indicates significant industrial structural changes. As Greece became a full member 
of the EEC/EU, the abolition of protectionism increased the percentage of imports in total domestic 
consumption from 23.6% in 1980 to 51.8% in 2001 (Table 1), whereas export trend rose to a lesser 
extent, from 18.4% in 1981 to 27.4% in 2001. Moreover, manufacturing output was often recorded 
at the 1980 level or lower (Table 1), especially that of capital goods. By the end of the period under 
investigation, the Greek economy has been already transformed into a service-oriented economy 
(Table 2) as the share of the services sector of GDP grew from 49.7% in 1980 to 63.7% in 2001 
(though a large part of the services were provided by the state: non-business services), whereas the 
corresponding share of manufacturing decreased from 15.2% in 1980 to 13.1% in 2001 and the 
primary sector (e.g. agriculture, fisheries) showed high losses. However, while GDP per capita was 
rising continuously, the number of surviving subsidiaries declined substantially after 1980 although 
some important cross-border acquisitions took place in the integration period (Figure 1). So, GDP 
growth was associated with widespread deindustrialization and significant MNE divestment. 
Tables 1 and 2 about here/  
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Figure 1 about here 
The study explores the strategic reaction of foreign MNEs to the external change, using a 
unique dataset consisting of 162 manufacturing MNE units, which were established in the country 
during the era of protectionism (1960-1980) (Table 3). The study excludes from the analysis cross-
border acquisitions that happened in the integration era as its primary research aim is the 
divestment investigation of existing subsidiaries and not the exploration of new establishments.  
We identify the sample subsidiaries in the official lists provided by all Foreign Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce based on Greece. The lists contain all foreign manufacturing units that 
operate in the country from year to year, with full data such as address, location, year of 
establishment, management, product groups, and industrial sector.  
Due to reliable information available for the whole period under examination, we could 
follow the survival outcome of all these units up to the year 2001 and conclude that out of a total of 
162 subsidiaries, 77 (47.5%) seized to operate, while 85 (52.5%)  could survive (Table 3). The net 
survival outcome was positive (survivors > closures) mainly in industries such as foods and 
chemical products and negative across several industries such as those of textiles, clothing, non-
metallic minerals, machines and transportation.  
Table 3 about here  
4. The context of integration development path  
Following the recent literature on firm divestment (for example Görg and Bandick, 2010) we apply 
the complementary log-log model (cloglog) which is equivalent to the discrete time version of the 
proportional hazard model. The hazard risk of a subsidiary closing at time t is formulated as:  
 h(t) = h0(t) exp(bX)             (1) 
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where h(t) represents the rate at which subsidiaries close at time t given that they have survived 
until  t-1, conditional on several covariates, h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t when all of the 
covariates are set to a specific value.  
For the specific purposes of the econometric analysis the study subsequently applies the 
following models. Models 1 and 2 analyze the full sample without interaction effects. Due to 
possible multicolinearity between the variables of GDP per Capita (GCAP) and integration 
(INTEGR), we exclude the variable INTEGR from the first model and the variable GCAP from the 
second model accordingly. Subsequently, due to importance of the technology factor (TECH) 
within IDP, we divide our sample according to technological intensity of the industry and run 
model 3 only for the high-tech industries, and model 4 only for the traditional industries. In 
addition, models 5 and 6 refer to the full sample with interaction effects. Model 5 comprises the 
interaction of the variables LABO (unskilled labor), TARIF (tariffs) and PDIF (product 
differentiation), interacting with the variable GCAP, whereas model 6 contains the interaction 
effects of the same variables with the variable TECH. 
 Three explanatory macroeconomic measures are used in the models (Table IV). These 
measures include GDP per capita (GCAP), integration (INTEGR), and tariffs (TARIF). 
Additionally, the robustness of the analysis is increased by using eight control variables, such as 
product differentiation (PDIF), business size (SIZE), year of business establishment (YEST), labor 
costs (LABO), technology-intensity of industry (TECH), openness of industry (OPEN), kind of 
industry (INDU), and physical distance between home and host country (DIST). Finally, 
interaction effects are incorporated in the models to potentially find out considerable relationships 
within the integration path of the country.  
The rationale for the choice of the specific variables is as follows. The crucial point in the 
empirical investigation is to capture the divestment impact of the critical turning point where the 
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Greek economy entered the EU (1981). This becomes possible through the variables INTEGR and 
TARIF. The first variable expresses the passage from protectionism to integration, while the 
second variable measures the reduction of tariffs during the integration procedure having 
considerable divestment implications. In addition, a main suggestion of IDP (Narula and Dunning, 
2000 and 2010) is the positive link between economic development and GDP per capita (GCAP) 
rises with ambiguous divestment effects. More precisely, economic development process 
influences location attractiveness twofold. The cost of utilizing unskilled labor rises as the country 
intensifies its use and, hence, the sitting of production in labor-intensive activities (LABO) 
becomes gradually less attractive to foreign investors and eventually fades out (e.g., Bernard et al. 
2006). At the same time, the integration process favors the development of created assets and inter 
alia the operation of units in differentiated industries (PDIFF). Furthermore, business size (SIZE) 
indicates economies of scale with positive survival prospects. Moreover, the inclusion of the year 
of establishment (YEST) in the models allows the examination of accumulated experience effects 
(as suggested by organizational learning perspective) in divestment risk. Also, the Greek 
integration path had a beneficial impact on traditional industries such as food and beverages with 
natural-based assets against of technologically advanced sectors (TECH) such as those of 
machinery, transportation etc. (Hallet, 2000; Midelfart-Knarvik et al, 2000) that exhibited 
international disadvantages and an increasing divestment risk. The literature on IDP (e.g., Dunning 
et al., 2001) suggests that economic development of a country is also shaped by its trade 
development path (TDP) that can be described as the development of national exports and imports 
in the global markets reflected in the degree of openness of the economy. Therefore, Dunning et al. 
(2001) support the idea of an integrated IDP and TDP in terms of a positive correlation of variables 
such as FDI, foreign trade, GDP per capita and created-asset intensity of industries. From this point 
of view, the two paths should interact with each other and determine the divestment outcome of 
MNE subsidiaries. This notion, lately, started to gain importance in the research interest among 
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international business scholars (e.g., Colantone and Sleuwaegen 2010). Therefore, the variable 
openness (OPEN) is utilized as a crucial proxy for divestment effects of external trade relations 
expecting that operation in an open, integrated environment might increase efficiency and reduce 
divestment risk. The variable INDU aims to capture industry dispersion effects on divestment. 
Finally, the variable of physical distance (DIST) between Greece and the home country may 
indicate trade costs such as transport costs that lower divestment probability. The definition of the 
selected variables is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 about here 
5. Empirical results on the Greek integration development path 
The sample period correlations between the independent variables are relatively low (all Pearson 
coefficients < 0.7), with an exemption to the case of GCAP and INTEGR (0.90), which reveals that 
economic development is positively associated with integration procedure (Table 5). Therefore, the 
above two variables are examined separately in our econometric technique, giving more emphasis 
in the GCAP variable. No serious multicollinearity problems were detected in the regression 
estimation since the largest variance inflation factor (VIF) was 2.0, which is much lower than the 
multicollinearity threshold of 10. 
Table 5 about here 
For the better understanding of the econometric results, we note that a positive sign of an 
estimated coefficient represents an increasing divestment risk and vice versa. The regression results 
of the six models are presented in Table 6. In particular we found that as the economy enters the 
EU (INTEGR) and achieved a higher per capita income (GCAP), many mature subsidiaries tended 
to close down, since they became “out of date”. In turn, a gradual reduction of TARIF increased 
exit risk since low tariff levels decreased trade costs for MNEs substantially. Simultaneously, a 
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continuous increase in labor unit cost (LABO) facilitated divestment, whereas product 
differentiation hampered it. Furthermore, it was found that rising current SIZE increased 
divestment, reversely, subsidiaries targeting on relatively smaller market segments could improve 
their survival chances. Moreover, YEST has a negative sign (even with different statistical 
significance across the models), indicating that relatively later establishments were exposed to 
lower exit risk, as these subsidiaries were better prepared to adjust to the single market conditions 
as compared to earlier establishments. Additionally, subsidiaries located in high-TECH industries 
had less survival chances compared to those operating in traditional branches. Furthermore, 
operation in an open environment (OPEN) limited divestment risk, as this might strengthen the 
culture of efficiency of the foreign units which have to be more innovative by following product 
differentiation strategies. The divestment impact of industry dispersion (INDU) across all models 
appeared to be ambiguous with changing significance, while the physical distance (DIST) variable 
had a divestment effect though local production could save transport costs. Potentially for Greece 
the immense geographical distance with the home country might cause high managerial and 
communication costs for the parent firm.  
Models 5 and 6 with the interaction effects support all of the abovementioned findings and 
provide new insights in the divestment phenomenon, in particular as regards the interaction of 
PDIF with GCAP and TECH correspondingly. In model 5, the interaction of PDIF with GCAP 
reveals that product differentiation could reverse the negative survival impact of economic 
development (GCAP). Similarly, in model 6, the interaction of PDIF with TECH shows that 
product differentiation can be a stimulating survival factor in high-tech industries, fully offsetting 
the positive divestment effect of technology-intensive branches. 
Table 6 about here 
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The aforementioned results are consistent with our conceptual framework leading to 
interesting policy implications and venues for future research, which we briefly present next.   
6. Conclusions 
Exploiting the central ideas of the IDP on critical turning/ inflection points of development and the 
particular idiosyncratic nature of the IDP for each country (Narula and Dunning, 2010), the paper 
specified the Paradigm and developed the appropriate conceptual framework for the analysis of 
foreign divestment in the Greek economy. Since the development profile of Greece was decisively 
shaped by its transition from protectionism to European integration (in 1981), regional integration 
effects were incorporated systematically into the analysis, thus extending the IDP concept. The 
specific transition reflected a strategic turning point of the development process as at that time the 
country attempted to enter the third IDP stage with painful structural effects. The analysis revealed 
that MNE subsidiaries established in the distant past became non-competitive and shut down due to 
exploitation of traditional advantages such as unskilled labor and tariff protection. The MNE 
subsidiaries shut down as they had to operate under quite different positions as compared to those 
of their establishment. At the same time, integration favoured subsidiaries with product 
differentiation, indicating its asymmetry divestment effects. Thus, the structural effects of 
integration and development overlap and work together, shaping the evolutionary and divestment 
process decisively.  
The study revealed the importance of foreign divestment within the IDP given that extant 
IDP research has completely ignored the specific issue concentrating on conventional FDI; 
although the main theoretical representatives of the Paradigm (Narula and Dunning, 2000; 2010) 
have not ruled out the pessimistic development scenario speaking about industrialization “failures”. 
Nevertheless, Narula and Dunning (2000; 2010) promote rather more a smooth gradual transition 
of emerging economies during their economic development process than the activation of wide 
 13 
disruptive effects (Buckley, 2012). Our study exhibited that the opposite scenario might be realistic 
as well supporting by Narula and GuimÏ n (2010) who claim that emerging economies cannot 
internally absorb external events that might cause a large scale restructuring, even a structural 
shock, within their economic system. From our point of view, such a structural shock that took 
place in Greece at the early European integration stages caused a substantial divestment in the local 
economy. In this way, the paper captured the European integration effects on foreign divestment 
and this can be considered as another novelty within the relevant literature. It should be underlined 
that although the main IDP scholars (Narula and Dunning, 2000 and 2010) recognize the 
importance of regional integration they do not systematically incorporate strong integration 
elements to the individual IDP stages. Given the specific structural weakness of the IDP, the study 
adds value to the integration development path of Greece locating a critical turning point that 
connects two quite different institutional and political regimes (protectionism vs. integration) with 
contrasting driving forces and complex interactions that facilitate divestment process.  
To sum up, the study offers some important contributions to the IDP literature. Firstly, to 
the best of our knowledge this is the first paper on the IDP Paradigm which explain foreign 
divestment instead of investment, thus, its analysis extends the current IDP research that explicitly 
focuses on traditional FDI. Secondly, the study places foreign divestment in a complex framework 
effectively combining regional integration and economic development effects. Finally, our paper 
utilizes a central element of IDP concerning turning points of development (Narula and GuimÏ n, 
2010; Narula and Dunning, 2010) to explain foreign divestment. In particular, we show that the 
failure of the Greek economy to “take off”, in other words, effectively to replace traditional 
industries via high-tech activities and thus reaching higher stages of IDP is a considerable source 
for divestment.  
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The empirical analysis has some relevant policy implications. In particular, this 
demonstrates that membership (in a regional agreement) itself might become a significant asset, but 
this might initiates considerable MNE divestment. However, it cannot be ruled out that European 
integration effects on divestment would be milder in the late integration stages, especially in the 
period of entry of Greece in Eurozone (2002 onwards), which is not included in the analysis. This 
is because Greece’s participation in the Eurozone was connected with a certain macroeconomic 
improvement such as lower inflation, lower interest rates and more political economic stability, at 
least till the advent of the current crisis. This might imply a certain mitigation of divestment risk of 
businesses which already gained substantial experience on structural adjustment at the early 
integration stages.  
To illustrate, in order to gain access to the EMU Greece followed a macroeconomic policy 
which targeted the nominal imbalances of the economy during the period 1994-2000. Thus annual 
inflation was reduced from 7.9% in 1996 to 3.9% in 2002; long term interest rates were reduced 
from 14.4% to 5.1% over the same period. The annual government deficit was reduced from -7.4% 
to -1.4% and the public debt was reduced from 111.3% to 104.7% over the same period (Bitzenis, 
2009). These nominal improvements were not however associated with the implementation of 
structural reforms thus the FDI inflows of the period remained extremely low. As Staboglis (2008) 
points out: “From a total of 140 countries which are under United Nation surveys Greece 
constantly is between 120th and 127th position [in terms of its ability to attract FDI]. From 1995 to 
2000, FDI inflows increased in Greece by 3% whereas in Spain the increase was 309%, in Portugal 
it was 891% and in Ireland it was 1,733%” (Staboglis, 2008). According to another study, between 
2004 and 2010 average FDI inflows in EU countries (expressed as a percentage of GNP) were 
3.7% whereas in Greece they were just 1% (Romeos, 2011). It goes without saying that the 
marginal nominal improvements of macroeconomics during the 1990s associated with the complete 
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absence of structural reforms and the inability to attract critical FDI levels are partial causes of the 
current crisis.    
Further, our findings raise questions about the role that could be played by economic policy 
to reduce divestment risk. Basically we can assume that a solid economic policy (fiscal, monetary  
etc.) could contribute to a more stable economic political environment and shrinkage of investment 
and divestment risks although it is difficult a quantification of such a reduction.1 At the same time, 
our analysis indicates that policy makers should not explicitly focus on conventional 
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP per capita which might be an imperfect proxy for 
development (see also Narula and Dunning, 2010) but also on international competitiveness and 
technology indices; the rise of GDP cannot always hamper divestment in manufacturing, especially 
when favoring services growth. In addition, our findings show that policy decision makers at 
industry level would not be able to hamper a de-industrialization process in activities with 
traditional assets. Instead, they could support second-time and more qualitative investment, 
determining the threshold levels of absorptive capacities that are crucial for the “take- off”.  
A more general policy implication is that emerging economies should avoid regional 
integration attempts, while they have not yet completed the risky, qualitative transition from the 
second to the third IDP stage. Another general policy implication is that policies towards inward 
investment should extend, much more decisively and comprehensively, beyond its initial attraction 
in order to seek to secure sustained benefits from these operations. Overall, the study offers a 
                                                 
1 We can assume that the risk will be reduced as national income increases and it is distributed in such a way in order to 
avoid or minimize social tensions. This is expressed by the following equation: Y=f(I xq+Cxs+Wxd+Txb)-(Q), 
whereas: Y=Total national income, I=Total investments of the period, q=percentage of the profit of the investment, 
C=aggregate capital infrastructure in the economy, S=efficiency of infrastructure, W=Total employment, D=Total 
labor productivity, T=Aggregate technological improvements of the period, b=Sectoral technological improvements, 
Q=Cohesion ratio between economic/ social classes. Thus Q is influenced by corruption, bureaucracy, low political 
stability, social tensions due to strikes, environmental catastrophes, etc. Even if investments are high but they do not 
reflect high social norms or standards, this will affect risk. Furthermore, if FDI is associated with technological 
transformation again the perception of the society is going to influence the risk levels. Thus, if a society believes that 
technological change is associated with job distraction and labor marginalization a negative reaction may eventually 
occur. See: Liousis et al., 2002.      
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divestment story that might be a useful learning process for integration and FDI policy in emerging 
economies. 
The analysis is focused in the 1980-2001 period. This is the time when immense changes 
occurred in the EEC/EU block and the first transformation of the EMS (European Monetary 
System) took place. In particular, the first common fiscal measures were introduced and the 
Maastricht Treat decided the establishment of the monetary union between the member states in 
1999, with the introduction of the Euro and the abolishment of the ECU. Although the priority of 
the European policy in the 1980s and 1990s was in the financial sphere, there was always emphasis 
of the Cohesion Fund on structural reforms and transformation of the economies of South Europe 
(Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal). Unfortunately no coherent policies occurred as regards the 
promotion of FDI and thus the issue of FDI inflows towards these states was marginalised. The 
nexus of the EEC/ EU failed economic policies with FDI inflows is certain an issue of another 
paper.  
In general, future research should apply divestment scenarios to individual national 
economies with integration attempts, given the strongly idiosyncratic nature of development path 
and the growing importance of regional integration dynamics which challenge economic 
development. In the corresponding IDP analysis it might be important to integrate several 
investment, integration and trade aspects (Dunning et al., 2001). As regards the case of Greece, our 
model could be extended later to include the period 2002-2015 in the analysis in order to 
investigate the impact of the EMU on divestment and compare early with late integration stages, 
taking into consideration the economic data of the period and associate them with the social 
mobility and traits of the same era. The nexus of the two elements would certainly cast light in the 
investment / disinvestment process and partially explain the current economic crisis.    
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FIGURE 1    GDP per Capita1 and number of the foreign subsidiaries in Greece 
 
1:  in $, at constant prices, 2005 (UNCTAD/ World Bank)  
 
Table 1  Indices of international competition and manufacturing output per category of goods 
 
YEAR 
Indices of international 
competition1 
Index of manufacturing output 
 (1980=100) 
Import 
penetration2 
Export 
performance3 
Consu
mer 
goods 
Durable  
consumer 
goods 
Capital 
goods 
Total 
manufacturing 
1980 23,6 18,4 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1981 23,5 15,7 110,9 99,8 86,1 103,7 
1982 25,1 16,5 108,3 91,5 77,7 97,4 
1983 27,3 18,6 106,3 89,2 79,8 96,9 
1984 28,6 20,8 108,2 87,5 81,8 98,4 
1985 29,8 20,0 111,4 97,4 81,2 101,0 
1986 31,6 20,7 111,6 101,5 79,3 100,3 
1987 34,8 23,0 110,1 89,0 76,3 98,3 
1988 31,3 17,0 115,5 81,0 84,3 103,4 
1989 38,6 22,4 119,1 84,9 83,0 105,6 
1990 41,2 22,1 110,3 75,3 92,1 102,6 
1991 42,4 22,6 107,7 81,2 92,1 101,7 
1992 44,7 24,6 105,5 81,7 92,0 100,4 
1993 45,1 25,1 103,8 88,7 84,5 97,1 
1994 45,8 27,0 106,4 88,5 83,2 98,2 
1995 47,6 27,4 106,9 87,2 88,6 100,3 
1996 46,3 27,5 107,7 89,3 88,7 100,9 
1997 49,5 28,7 107,1 95,3 92,5 101,9 
1998 51,5 28,1 110,1 118,3 94,4 105,3 
1999 50,6 27,2 109,7 130,2 95,7 106,0 
2000 50,9 27,5 109,9 129,8 95,6 106,0 
2001 51,8 27,4 110,0 130,1 95,5 105,9 
Source: Bank of Greece, National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) 
1at constant prices of 1988; 2[import/(domestic production + import – export)]*100; 3(export/domestic production)*100 
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Table 2    Sectoral composition (%) of GDP1 
Sectors / industry 1980 1985 1990 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Primary production 
 
25,0 
 
15,6 
 
10,5 
 
11,3 
 
11,0 
 
10,8 
 
10,0 
Industrial production 
 
25,3 
 
26,1 
 
26,5 
 
25,8 
 
26,5 
 
26,6 
 
26,3 
          Mining  0,6 1,0 0,9 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7 
          Manufacturing  
 
15,2 
 
15,9 
 
15,3 
 
14,1 
 
14,0 
 
13,8 
 
13,1 
          Construction  7,7 7,0 7,6 7,7 8,3 8,8 8,0 
 Utilities       
(power/gas/water) 
1,8 2,2 2,7 3,3 3,3 3,4 4,5 
Services  
 
 
49,7 
 
58,3 
 
63,0 
 
62,9 
 
62,5 
 
62,6 
 
63,7 
Total  
 
100,0 
 
100,0 
 
100,0 
 
100,0 
 
100,0 
 
100,0 
 
100,0 
 
Source: Federation of Greek Industries 
 
 
 
Table 3 Industry breakdown of the 162 foreign subsidiaries 
Industry  
NACE (4-digit level) 
TOTAL NUMBER 
(stand 1980) 
Total 
CLOSURES 
(1981-2001) 
Total 
SURVIVORS 
(stand 2001) 
Total 
 
Foods/ Beverages/Tobacco 
Textiles/Clothing/Leather – Footwear 
Paper/Printing–Publishing 
Chemical products/Rubber prod./Plastics 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metals/ Metal products  
Machines/ Equipment/Electrical machinery   
Transportation 
Other industries 
 
 
22 
22 
7 
50 
15 
19 
23 
2 
2 
 
5 
19 
4 
16 
9 
9 
13 
2 
0 
 
 
17 
3 
3 
34 
6 
10 
10 
0 
2 
 
TOTAL 162 77 85 
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Table 4  Variables used in the study 
Name Definition Literature 
DIVEST 
(dependent) 
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for 
subsidiaries that divest and 0 otherwise 
McCloughan and Stone, 1998 
GCAP GDP per capita in U.S. dollars, constant prices  Narula and Dunning, 2000; Galan et al., 2007; 
Narula and Dunning, 2010 
INTEGR a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for 
integration and 0 otherwise  
Narula and Dunning, 2000; Galan et al., 2007; 
Narula and Dunning, 2010 
TARIF nominal protection rate for each industry Culem, 1988; Baldwin and Yan, 2011 
PDIF product differentiation; the contribution of 
advertising expenditure to sales for each industry 
Caves, 1971; Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2000 
SIZE current size; labor force (ln) McCloughan and Stone, 1998; Pennings and 
Sleuwaegen, 2000; Colombo and Delmastro, 2001 
YEST year of establishment; it indicates the age of the 
subsidiary 
McCloughan and Stone 1998 
LABOR labor unit cost for each industry Culem, 1988; Bernard et al., 2006 
TECH dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
industry is technology intensive and 0 otherwise 
Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2000; Yamawaki, 2004 
OPEN the sum of import and export penetration ratio for 
each industry 
Colantone and Sleuwaegen, 2010; Harris and Li, 
2011 
INDU a variable that accounts for the industry dispersion Colantone and Sleuwaegen, 2010 
DIST physical distance between Greece and the home 
country in miles 
De Silva and McComb, 2012; Nachum and Zaheer, 
2005 
 
TABLE 5   Pearson Correlations - independent variables  
Variables TARI    PDIF    DIST   TECH   GCAP   INTEGR  LABO   SIZE   YEST   INDU   OPEN 
TARIF 
PDIF 
DIST 
TECH 
GCAP 
INTEGR  
LABO 
SIZE 
YEST 
INDU 
OPEN 
 
1.00      
-0.22     1.00    
-0.03     0.34       1.00 
-0.04     0.16       0.13     1.00 
-0.70     0.07       -0.01    -0.03     1.00 
-0.69     0.06       -0.01    -0.04     0.90     1.00         
-0.32     -0.18      -0.11    -0.13     0.47     0.45     1.00 
-0.14     0.40        0.08     -0.05     0.16     0.16     0.02       1.00     
-0.22     -0.30      -0.12     -0.21    0.27     0.25     0.18       -0.38 
0.01      -0.07       -0.10     0.52     -0.03    -0.02   -0.04     -0.01     -0.05      1.00 
-0.34     -0.08       -0.05     0.21     0.40     0.39     0.54       0.11      0.03       0.17      1.00                                                                          
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TABLE   6  Econometric results 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
without 
INTEGR 
(2) 
with 
INTEGR 
(3) 
TECH = 1 
(4) 
TECH = 0 
(5) 
Interaction 
GCAP 
(6) 
Interaction 
TECH 
Explanatory Variables 
GCAP 
 
INTEGR 
 
TARIF 
 
 
Control variables 
PDIF 
 
SIZE 
 
YEST 
 
LABO 
 
TECH 
 
OPEN 
 
INDU 
 
DIST 
 
 
Interactions 
LABO*GCAP 
 
TARIF*GCAP 
 
PDIF*GCAP 
 
LABO*TECH 
 
TARIF*TECH 
 
PDIF*TECH 
 
 
Constant 
 
Observations 
Log - likelihood 
 
 
0.391*** 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.123*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
-1.136*** 
(0.054) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
11.696*** 
(0.735) 
0.840*** 
(0.119) 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.044* 
(0.024) 
0.344*** 
(0.026) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32.014** 
(15.063) 
4,412 
-796.251 
 
 
 
0.997*** 
(0.160) 
0.134*** 
(0.064) 
. 
 
-1.153*** 
(0.054) 
0.002*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019* 
(0.007) 
11.461*** 
(0.594) 
0.929*** 
(0.114) 
-0.024*** 
(0.002)  
-0.040* 
(0.023) 
354*** 
(0.027)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32.259* 
(15.296) 
4,412 
-774.411 
 
0.464*** 
(0.040) 
 
 
0.140*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
-0.954*** 
(0.053) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
10.327*** 
(1.316) 
 
 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.101 
(0.063) 
0.394*** 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.528 
(22.835) 
2,391 
-434.302 
 
 
0.331*** 
(0.035) 
 
 
0.099*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
-1.817*** 
(0.138) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.034** 
(0.015) 
12.057*** 
(0.777) 
 
 
-0.039*** 
(0.004) 
-0.107*** 
(0.029) 
0.288*** 
(0.060) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63.657** 
(30.014) 
2,021 
-305.599 
 
0.789*** 
(0.045) 
 
 
0.115*** 
(0.007) 
 
 
-0.530*** 
(0.087) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
-0.060*** 
(0.008) 
69.325*** 
(7.380) 
0.813*** 
(0.167) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.085*** 
(0.027) 
0.387*** 
(0.031) 
 
 
5.299*** 
(0.577) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.089*** 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109.097*** 
(15.831) 
4,412 
-606.863 
 
0.381*** 
(0.025) 
 
 
0.111*** 
(0.007) 
 
 
-1.821*** 
(0.123) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
 9.916*** 
(0.610) 
0.669** 
(0.265) 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.071*** 
(0.025) 
0.343*** 
(0.027) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.016*** 
(1.403) 
0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.924*** 
(0.126) 
 
5.610 
(16.535) 
4,412 
-755.197 
Notes: Log – log model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the subsidiary 
divest and zero otherwise. Robust statistics (standard errors) are presented in the parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
